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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 82 / 216

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Following a decision to do so,Iraq could produce:

-

significant quantities of mustard within weeks;

-

significant quantities of sarin and VX within months,and in the case of VX ma y have already done so.

68

[JIC, 15 March 2002]

[JIC, 15 March 2002]

276.

We conclude that this assessment reflects fairly the intelligence position on Iraq’s chemical weapons programme prior to the receipt of new intelligence (described below) in summer 2002, which was considered substantial at the time (although some has subsequently been withdrawn and doubt cast on some of the rest). We note that the JIC said that it had very little intelligence in this area. We also note the way in which, through the use of the word ‘may’, the JIC reflected previous intelligence reports on Iraqi

272.

Underpinning this assessment, the JIC noted that:

Although there is very little intelligence we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. We assess the programme to be based on gas

273.

and that:

[JIC, 15 March 2002]

centrifuge uranium enrichment . scientists were recalled to work on

we do not know if large scale Procurement of dual-use items over enrichment programme.

development work has yet recommenced. the past few years could be used in a uranium

Overall, the JIC judged that:

Iraq may retain some stocks of chemical agents.

We continue to judge that Iraq has an offensive chemical warfare (CW) programme, although there is very little intelligence relating to it. From the evidence available to us,we believe Iraq retains some production equipment,and some small stoc ks of CW agent precursors,and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons. Anomalies in Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM suggest stocks could be much larger.

..

Recent

intelligence

a nuclear programme in

indicates that nuclear the autumn of 1998,but

[JIC, 15 March 2002]

274.

On Iraq’s chemical weapons programme, the JIC reported in Key Judgements to its assessment that:

275.

Underpinning these judgements, the JIC said that:

...

while sanctions remain effective,Iraq cannot indigenously develop a nd

produce

nuclear

weapons;

if

sanctions

were

removed

or

became

ineffective,it

would

timescale

This

would take at least five years to produce a shorten if fissile material was acquired from

nuclear abroad.

weapon.

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