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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 87 / 216





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Although we have little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW doctrine,and know litt le about Iraq’s CBW work since late 1998,we judge it likely that Saddam would order t he use of CBW against coalition forces at some point,probably after coalition at tacks had begun. Iraqi CBW use would become increasingly likely the closer coalition forces came to Baghdad. Military targets might include troop concentrations or important fixed targets in rear areas such as ports and airfields.

and that:

Should he feel his fate is sealed,Saddam’s judgement might change to ‘brin g the temple down’ on his enemies no matter what the cost to the country as a whole. We judge that at this stage,Saddam would order the unrestrained use of CBW aga inst coalition forces,supporting regional states and Israel,although he wou ld face practical problems of command and control,the loyalty of his commanders, logistics problems and the availability of chemical or biological agents in sufficient quantities to be effective and the means to deliver them.

[JIC, 21 August 2002]

  • 293.

    We were told that the JIC’s conclusions were based in part on one human intelligence report from one source, but mainly on the JIC’s own judgements. They thus represent an insight into the views of JIC members of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities at that time.

  • 294.

    The JIC assessment of 9 September also focused on Iraq’s use of chemical and biological weapons (indeed, although issued later, it was prepared in parallel with the assessment of 21 August). Its tone was set by its first Key Judgement, which reflected a significant change from previous JIC judgements on Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons:

Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared to use it.

[JIC, 9 September 2002]


The paper recorded that:

Recent intelligence casts light on Iraq’s holdings of weapons of mass destruction and on its doctrine for using them.

[JIC, 9 September 2002]

but warned that, nevertheless:

Intelligence remains limited and Saddam’s own unpredictability complicates judgements about Iraqi use of these weapons. Much of this paper is necessarily based on judgement and assessment.

[JIC, 9 September 2002]


It then went on to judge that:

Iraq currently has available,either from pre Gulf War stocks or more recen t production,a number of biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and weapons; . . .


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