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Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004 - page 95 / 216





95 / 216

Quotations from JIC Assessments “Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological

Quotations from the dossier

Weapons – Possible Scenarios” (9 September 2002)

Recent intelligence casts light on Iraq’s

As well as the public evidence,h owever,

holdings of weapons of mass destruction and significant additional information is available

on its doctrine for using them. Intelligence remains limited and Saddam’s own unpredictability complicates judgements about Iraqi use of these weapons. Much of

to the Government from secret intelligence sources,described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. However,it provides a fuller

this paper is necessarily based on judgement picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. and assessment.

“Iraq; Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options” (21 August 2002) . . . we have little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW doctrine,and know little about Iraq’s CBW work since late 1998 . . .

Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designe d to remain concealed. The nature of Saddam’s regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services. Intelligence,however, has provided important insights into Iraqi programmes and Iraqi military thinking. Taken together with what is already known from other sources,this intelligence builds our understanding of Iraq’s capabilities and adds significantly to the analysis already in the public domain. But intelligence sources need to be protected,and this limits the detail that can be made available.

“The Status of Iraqi WMD Programmes” (15 March 2002) Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes is sporadic and patchy. Iraq is also well practised in the art of deception, such as concealment and exaggeration. A complete picture of the various programmes is therefore difficult. But it is clear that Iraq continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and their delivery means.

Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most significant views reached by the JIC between 1999 and 2002.


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