Quotations from JIC Assessments
Quotations from the dossier
Saddam attaches great importance to having Saddam continues to attach great importance CBW,is committed to using CBW if he can and to the possession of weapons of ma ss is aware of the implications of doing so. destruction and ballistic missiles which he Saddam wants it to dominate his neighbours regards as being the basis for Iraq’s regional and deter his enemies who he considers are power. He is determined to retain these unimpressed by his weakened conventional capabilities. military capability. [Chapter 3, paragraph 1]
Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared to use it.
It [the intelligence] shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort.
[Executive Summary, paragraph 4]
Faced with the likelihood of military defeat and being removed from power,Saddam is unlikely to be deterred from using chemical and biological weapons by any diplomatic or military means.
The use of chemical and biological weapons prior to any military attack would boost support for US-led action and is unlikely.
has Iraq possesses extended-range versions of
identified Bahrain,Jordan,Qatar,Israelthe SCUD ballistic missile in b
reach of UNSCR
Kuwait as targets. Turkey could also be at risk. 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, [9 September] Eastern Turkey,Tehran and Israel. [Chapter 3, paragraph 1]
Saddam is prepared to order missile strikes against Israel,with chemical or biological warheads,in order to widen the war once hostilities begin.
The first extract from the dossier fairly reflects the 9 September JIC assessment. While the context of the last three extracts from the assessment, that Iraq would use chemical and biological weapons only in the event of an attack, is not repeated in the dossier, this was because the dossier was dealing with the overall picture, while the JIC’s assessment of 9 September was only looking at attack scenarios.