be in good-faith if it is shown that the settling parties engaged in wrongful conduct, collusion, or
fraud,” or “if it conflicts with the terms of the Act or is inconsistent with the policies underlying the
Act.” Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 134, 784 N.E.2d at 821. The two public policies underlying the Act
include “the encouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment of damages among
tortfeasors.” Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 133, 784 N.E.2d at 821.
Here, the U-Haul entities do not argue that any wrongful conduct, collusion, or fraud
occurred to undermine the circuit court’s finding of good faith. Nor do they argue that the public
policy of the Act to encourage settlement was violated. Instead, the U-Haul entities argue that the
settlement agreement entered into between Buffalo Grove and Cellini was inconsistent with the Act’s
second public policy of promoting the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors
because Buffalo Grove was a primary and direct cause of Cellini’s injuries and its $1 million
settlement with Cellini would shift a disproportionate percentage of the liability onto the U-Haul
entities at trial.
In order to prove whether a settlement was negotiated in good faith within the meaning of
the Act, the settling parties “carrythe initial burden of making a preliminaryshowing of good faith.”
Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 132, 784 N.E.2d at 820. Once a preliminary showing of good faith is made
by the settling parties, the burden of proof shifts to the nonsettling party, who challenges the good
faith of the settlement, by proving “the absence of good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 132, 784 N.E.2d at 820. “Ultimately, however, whether a settlement satisfies
the good faith requirements as contemplated by the [Act] is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
court based upon the court’s consideration of the totality of the circumstances.” Johnson, 203 Ill.