170.R. Jacob Landau, HaAgur, Hilkhot Shehita, sec. 1062 (ed. Hershler, pp. 171); R. Shabbetai haKohen, Siftei Kohen, Y.D. sec. 1, no. 1 and H.M. sec. 37, no. 38; R. Aaron Perahya haKohen, Resp. Parah Mate Aharon, I, secs. 63 and 68; R. Judah Ayash, Resp. Beit Yehuda, E.H. sec. 5, s.v. “uKemo she-katavti;” Arukh haShulhan, Y.D. sec. 1, no. 37; R. Joel Teitelbaum, Resp. Divrei Yoel, I, O.H. sec. 10, no. 7 and Y.D. sec. 99, no. 3. This also seems to be the view of R. Elijah Mizrachi, Resp. R. Elijah Mizrahi, sec. 16. See also Resp. Hatam Sofer, E.H. sec. 41, s.v. “He’erakhnu ba-zeh.” The expression “Lo ra’inu eino ra’aya” appears first in Mishnah Eiduyot 2:2. An alternate reading is “Ein lo ra’inu ra’aya;” see Mishna Zevahim 12:4 and Talmud Zevahim 103b. The former reading is the predominant one in the rishonim and aharonim.
171.R. Joshua Boaz, Shiltei haGibborim, Bava Metsia, chap. 7, sec. 495, no. 2; Beit Yosef, Y.D. sec. 1, s.v. “Um”sh nashim;” R. Ephraim haKohen, Resp. Sha’ar Efrayyim, E.H. sec. 112, s.v. “Omnam ra’iti” and ff.; R. Yair Bacharach, Resp. Havvot Ya’ir, sec. 42, s.v. “Od katavti” and sec. 78; R. Jonathan Eybeschutz, Kereiti uFleiti, Y.D. sec. 1, Kereiti, no. 4 and Urim veTummim, H.M. sec. 37, Tumim, no. 24; R. Samuel Ashkenazi, Mekom Shmuel, II, Y.D. sec. 1; R. Hayyim Broda, Torah Or veDerekh Hayyim, I, Y.D. sec. 1, Derekh Hayyim, no. 1; R. Jacob Hayyim Sofer, Kaf haHayyim, Y.D. sec. 1, no. 10; R. Halfon Moses haKohen, Resp. Sho’el veNishal, V, O.H. sec. 82, s.v. “Gam m”sh” (cf. ibid., sec. 1, s.v. “Akh nire”); R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Mesora 13 (Adar 5757), p. 25. This also seems to be the view of R. Alexander Sender Schor, Simla Hadasha, sec 1, Tevu’ot Shor, no. 14 (end). See also R. Joseph Ibn Ezra, Massa Melekh, Ne’ilat She’arim, Minhagei Mammon, root 7, pp. 63c-64a.
R. Nissim Hayyim Moses Mizrahi, Resp. Admat Kodesh, I, E.H. sec. 31, and his brother, R. Israel Meir Mizrahi, Resp. Peri haArets, II, sec. 2, both distinguish between two cases: (1) where the action is fundamentally permitted according to halakha, yet the posek is asked now to forbid it due to a claim of minhag resulting from passive behavior of the community; (2) where an activity has already been declared prohibited in previous generations due to minhag and the posek is now asked to rule that the old custom is no longer in force due to the community’s passive behavior. These two rabbinic brothers maintain that a proper formulation of the halakhic rule is that a community’s passive behavior is incapable of changing the halakhic status quo. Consequently, in case 1, the communal passive behavior will not support the conclusion that a prohibitive minhag has developed contrary to the established halakha; thus the activity will remain permissible.