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be-khol yom, sec. 4, no. 48—Be’er Yehuda, note 8, s.v. “Od katav haTosafot.” 3) Yad haKetana, ibid., sec. 13, Minhat Ani, note 15, suggests one further possibility, namely that hanufa is forbidden in cases where there is “only a slight chance” (hashash rahok) of mortal danger but permitted in cases of clear and imminent threat. 4) Finally, R. Moses Bezalel Sinai, ibid., and R. Eliyahu Rot, Sha’arei Teshuva ha-meFurash, sec. 188, HaRotse biTshuva, s.v. Li-msor” and “she-he-henifu,” argue that hanufa is forbidden in cases of “financial danger” (sakanat mamon)—and this is the “danger” referred to by R. Jonah—but is certainly permitted in cases of “mortal danger.” The view of R. Jonah is also cited by R. Israel Meir haKohen Kagan, Hafeits Hayyim, Petiha, la’avin 16 and Be’er Mayyim Hayyim ad loc. This seems to contradict what he writes in Mishna Berura, O.H. end of sec. 196, where he permits praising even murder in cases of danger—unless he maintains one of the above distinctions. For a general discussion of hanufa, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, XVI, Hanufa,” p. 375; R. Alfred Cohen, “Chanifa,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society XXXVII (Spring 1999, Peach 5759), pp. 5-19.

It is unlikely that Rabbeinu Jonah agrees with Maharshal’s position on ziyyuf haTorah (see discussion at note 123), since R. Jonah writes in Sha’arei Teshuva, Gate III sec. 52, that teaching Jewish law wrongly and incorrectly (“she-lo ka-dat ve-she-lo ke-halakha”) violates “. . . before a blind individual, thou shalt not place a stumbling block” (Lev. 19:14). Nothing else is mentioned. See also Addendum, Part 4b.

Part 3: Views and Cases Demonstrating that Ziyyuf haTorah Does Not Require Martyrdom.

As mentioned above, text at note 133, Rabbis Feinstein, Herzog and Henkin opine that Maharshal’s position on ziyyuf haTorah is quite problematic and/or is certainly not reflected by normative Jewish Law. The following represents a partial list of views and cases we have collected which apparently demonstrate that misrepresenting halakha is merely another form of lying, which may be permitted under certain conditions (see Addendum Part 6; see also note 132 regarding double-talk) and is by no means grounds for martyrdom. [This list does not take into account the aforementioned distinctions suggested by Rabbis Henkin and Herzog (note 129) according to the view of Maharshal.]

(a) R. Jonathan haKohen of Lund, cited in Shita Mekubetset to Bava Kama 38a, s.v. Shor shel Yisrael,” clearly states that when necessary, halakha may be distorted in order to make it more acceptable to non-Jews.

(b) Rashi, Berakhot 43b, s.v.ve-lo hi,” indicates that the noted amora, Rav Papa, was

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