O.H. sec. 25, no. 32, invokes mi-gdar milta le-heteira as a consideration in permitting a minor to be the ba’al korei at a premature weekday celebration of a bar mitsva. R. Joel Teitelbaum (of Satmar), Resp. Divrei Yoel, Y.D. sec. 35, no. 4, argues that today we do not have the power of le-mi-gdar milta le-heteira. R. Fisher does not take note of the fact that, regarding both the cases of Berakhot and Keritut, some commentaries, ad loc., indicate that these were examples of hora’at sha’a (a temporary abrogation or change of the law) presumably effected by the authority of the Sanhedrin or the leading scholar of the generation and, hence, cannot serve as precedents for normative halakhic procedure. See, for example, R. Jonathan Shteiff, Hadashim Gam Yeshanim, Berakhot 63a, first interpretation; R. Jacob Schor, Mishnat Ya’akov, Birkat Ya’akov, Berakhot 63a; Rashi, Keritut 8a, s.v. “Nikhnas le-beit din”; Rabbis Ovadiah Bartenura, Yisrael Lipschitz (Tiferet Yisrael) and Pinhas Kehati, Mishna Keritut 1:7; R. Moses Ibn Habib, Kapot Temarim, Sukka 34b, s.v. “Tosafot, d”h ve-li-drosh”; R. Avigdor Kohen Zedek, cited by R. Zidkiyahu ben Abraham, Shibbolei haLeket, Hilkhot Lulav, sec. 355; and Sefer Beit Aharon, supra, Addendum, Part 3b, sec. 26, pp. 438ff. (For a discussion of the relationship between hora’at sha’a and mi-gdar milta,see R. Zevi Hirsch Chajes, Torat haNevi’im.) A similar approach is suggested by R. Barukh Frankel Te’omim, Resp. Ateret Hakhamim, E.H. sec. 29, in explaining Seder Eliyahu Rabba of Tanna deVei Eliyahu 4:1, where Moses attributes the command to kill the worshipers of the Golden Calf to God (Exodus 32:27), when in fact it was his own idea. (Regarding Tanna deVei Eliyahu, see also R. Reuben Margaliot, Margaliyyot haYam, Sanhedrin 89a, sec. 23.) Moreover, R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh leNer, Sukkot 34b, s.v. “Sham, d”h ve-li-drosh,” indicates that such a hora’at sha’a—permitting the forbidden in order to prevent future violations—may be invoked only if the possible future violations are extremely serious, like those punishable by karet. R. Jacob Schor, Mishnat Ya’akov, Birkat Ya’akov (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1990), Berakhot 63a (see Addendum, Part 3d), allows such a hora’at sha’a only where the unity of kelal Yisrael is seriously threatened.
(j) An interesting example is the requirement to locate the bima in the center of the shul. R. Moses Feinstein, Resp. Igrot Moshe, O.H., II, sec. 42, argues that R. Moses Sofer’s stringency in this matter stemmed from his fear of Reform influences and was a case of le-mi-gdar milta. Where the desire to move the bima stems from other practical considerations (e.g., acoustics), it is permitted. In other words, where the concern is no longer valid, the geder is no longer applicable.
(k) The Late Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Pesakim uKhtavim I, She’eilot uTshuvot