sec. 2; R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Resp. Benei Vanim I, sec. 37, no. 12; Niv Sefatayyim, part 1, helek 3, sec. 3 and part 2, helek 3, sec. 3, citing Gittin 62a (see Addendum, Part 3i); R. Israel Yacov Fisher (Addendum, Part 3l and Part 4i); Resp. Yabia Omer, II, H.M. sec. 3. Similarly, R. Chaim Kanievsky, Masekhet Kutim, 1:14, Me-taher, note 30, and conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer (February 20, 1995), maintains that if a posek believes an action should be prohibited because of mi-gdar milta, he may misrepresent the reason for or source of a prohibition; since there will be no change in the legal outcome, mi-dvar sheker tirhak does not apply. This may also be the opinion of R. Ovadiah Yosef, introduction to Yalkut Yosef, VII, and R. Gavriel Zinner, Nitei Gavriel—Hilkhot Aveilut: Dinei uMinhagei Hishtatfut beSimha, p. 29, note 21 (see also Addendum Part 4d), who argue that R. Jacob Ettlinger, Binyan Tsiyyon, sec. 139, forbade a mourner to dance at his own wedding—even though it was after sheloshim and clearly permitted—lest mixed dancing result. According to R. Yosef and R. Zinner, R. Ettlinger purposely gave the wrong reason for the prohibition because people tend to be much more careful about the laws of mourning than they are regarding mixed dancing. This may also be the opinion of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who is reported to have commented on Meiri’s ruling (Bava Kamma 38a) that Jewish tort laws apply to civilized non-Jews as well. R. Auerbach maintains that this is, in fact, not the case; however, Meiri so ruled because people were being lenient about damages to non-Jews. See: R. Nahum Stepansky, “veAlehu Lo Yibol,” I, p. 37.
In a conversation with Aryeh A. Frimer and Noach Dear (March 8, 1996), Rabbi Zelig Epstein also maintained that “mi-dvar sheker tirhak” is not applicable to cases where halakha is misrepresented so as to prevent future violations of Jewish law. This is because mi-dvar sheker tirhak only refers to lying in court; see: Commentaries of R. Abraham Ibn Ezra and R. Samuel ben Meir (Rashbam), Exodus, 23:7; R. Eliezer ben R. Shmuel of Metz (Re'em), Sefer Yere’im 235; R. Jerucham Fishel Perlau, Commentary to Rav Sa’adia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvot, I, p. 156b. R. Zvi Elimelekh Wolfson, Kovets Bet Aharon veYisrael [Karlin-Stolin], 10:5 (59) (Sivan-Tammuz 5755), pp. 70-76 suggests that lying even outside court is forbidden because of mi-dvar sheker tirhak; though if the lie comes to “correct matters” (she-oseh eizeh tikkun) it is permissible. He gives no clear parameters for this.
On the other hand, R. Joshua Menahem Mendel Ehrenberg, Resp. Devar Yehoshua, I, addendum to sec. 19, no. 6 (see also V, Y.D. sec 12) demonstrates that the consensus of posekim rishonim and aharonim is that mi-dvar sheker tirhak applies in all cases, even outside court (see also R. Zvi Elimelekh Wolfson, ibid.). R. Ehrenberg further