use of classical concepts. His solution centered on recognizing the language of physics as an extension of an ordinary language core and restricting their usage in contexts characterized by Planck's constant.
2. The Language of Classical Physics.
The language of classical physics evolved in such a way that it supported and structured the discourse of physics, and played a background role interrelating the different branches of physics. Yet, the role of language is virtually absent from almost all philosophical analyses of physics. Before venturing into such unexplored waters it is helpful to consider, at least in a cursory way, the principal reasons why it is unexplored. This supplies a rough guide to the problems needing consideration. The neglect stems both from the practice of physics and the current territorial claims in philosophy.
The first is the rhetoric of physics. This commenced when Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton all stressed a radical break between common sense, systematized in Aristotelian scholasticism, and the new science. Since, both Kepler and Galileo argued, mathematical forms are the exemplars built into creation, one can comprehend the universe only by grasping these forms. Descartes famous dream, in which the angel of truth pointed to mathematics as the sole key that unlocks the secrets of nature, and the formidable mathematics of Principia I and II, that preceded the application to the system of the world in Book III, both signaled mathematics as the new language of physics. As shown in Part One, the new ontologies, proposed as foundational, never really supported the edifice of physics. Yet the break between common sense views and the growing complexity of mathematical physics reinforced the rhetorical divide and obscured the underlying linguistic continuity.
A second reason for inadvertence to the problem lies in the very nature of language. Fluent speakers of any language converse without any conscious consideration of the presuppositions and structures implicit in the language spoken. It is only when the language itself becomes an object of study that such presuppositions and structures come into focal awareness. Philosophical analyses of modern physics analyze theories, induction, confirmation, formal inferences, statistical hypotheses, but not the language of discourse linking experimenters and theoreticians. Though this is an outgrowth of ordinary language, it has features that sharply distinguish it from any ordinary language. It is highly mathematical and virtually the same in the various languages in which it has been embedded. Ordinary language analysis has not developed methods for handling such features.
On the contemporary scene, the primary reason for the philosophical neglect of the language of physics is the divisiveness of contemporary philosophy. A generation back Quine and Sellars linked ordinary language analysis to the foundations of science. Now ordinary language is central to mainstream analysis and, to a lesser extent, to the hermeneutic wing of the phenomenological tradition. Neither group, however, analyze the language of physics. Philosophers of science treat physics, but have a well-established tradition of neglecting the role of language. The axiomatic method of theory reconstruction, favored by logical positivists, replaced, rather than analyzed, the functioning language of science. The semantic conception of theories rejected the excess concern with language characterizing axiomatics. Since theories admit of different formulations, one should not focus on any particular linguistic formulation, but rather on the underlying mathematical structures. In the context interpretation of theories is seen