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German Law Journal

[Vol. 11 No. 02

its advantages and disadvantages w i t h t h e C o d e s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 7 73 4 .

as well as empirical studies regarding the compliance

In any event, the disclosure obligation forces both the management board and the supervisory board to think about the corporate governance of their enterprise and possible improvements at least once a year.75 In this regard, Section 161 strengthens the sense of responsibility of both boards’ members for issues of corporate governance. This is crucial since the Government Commission “German Corporate Governance Code” acts as a standing commission that reviews and refines the Code on an annual basis.76 However, this was not the primary reason for establishing the GCGC; the Code’s foreword reveals the ultimate goal: “The Code aims at making the German Corporate Governance system transparent and understandable. Its purpose is to promote the trust of international and national investors, customers, employees and the general public in the management and supervision of listed German stock corporations.”

Furthermore, the Code emphasizes the value of the German supervisory board system and it develops that system significantly further. Again, the Code’s foreword states, “In practice the dual board system, also established in other continental European countries, and the single‐board system are converging because of the intensive interaction of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board in the dual‐board system.” Indeed, the above‐mentioned Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 5.1.1 GCGC stand for the new approach that both boards cooperate closely, coordinate and decide jointly on the enterprise’s strategic approach and on measures of fundamental importance to the enterprise. Generally, the recommendations concerning the supervisory board take the center stage of the Code.77 For example, Section 3.4 GCGC substantiated the joint responsibility of both the

73 See, e.g,. LIEDER (note 2), 595‐603; see also Eberhard Vetter, Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex nur ein zahnloser Tiger? – Zur Bedeutung von §161 AktG für Beschlüsse der Hauptversammlung, 11 NZG 121 (2008).

74 See, e.g., Axel von Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex Report 2009: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, 62 DB 689 (2009); Wolfgang Becker et al., Wie stehen mittelständische Unternehmen zur Corporate Governance? – Aktuelle empirische Erkenntnisse, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (ZCG) 5 (2009); Axel von Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex Report 2008: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, 61 DB 825 (2008); Manuel René Theisen & Martin Raßhofer, Wie gut ist “Gute Corporate Governance”? – Ein aktueller Praxistest, 60 DB 1317 (2007); Axel von Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex Report 2007: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, 60 DB 879 (2007); LIEDER (note 2), 604‐605; Axel von Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex Report 2006: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, 59 DB 849 (2006).

75

Official Explanatory Statement (note 55), 21; see also, Schiessl (note 58), 594.

76 See, Foreword GCGC; see also, Official Explanatory Statement (note 55), 10; Ulrich Seibert, Im Brennpunkt: Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex ist da, 57 BB 581 (2002).

77

See, Hopt & Roth (note 65), Section 95, margin number 25; Ulmer (note 71), 154‐155.

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