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156

German Law Journal

[Vol. 11 No. 02

medium‐sized companies strongly prefer this system. On the other hand, about 20% of the publicly held corporations listed on the stock exchange chose the dual board structure, in particular banks, insurance companies and corporations with an international focusing. Similar tendencies can be discovered in Belgium.186 Evidence from Italy shows that especially start‐up firms are looking for a flexible and low‐cost model that they may find by adopting the one‐tier board system.187 On the other hand, the dual board system has been adopted by corporations with shares widely distributed among the public, and by state‐ owned firms. 185 188

To provide an option between the two systems was advocated by the High Level Group189 and the Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union as of 2003190 as well as by legal scholars191 and practitioners192. In Addition, Art. 38 of the Statute for a European Company allows the SE to be structured comprising either both a management board and a supervisory board (two‐tier model) or an integrated administrative board (one‐tier model). Empirical research shows that a majority of SE incorporated in Germany193 as well as incorporated throughout Europe194

185

Fleischer (note 174), 529; Teichmann (note 178), 664; Hopt (note 157), 1051.

186

Teichmann (note 178), 664‐665.

187

Ghezzi & Malberti (note 184), 44.

188

Ghezzi & Malberti (note 184), 45.

189

High Level Group (note 85), 59.

190 Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament "Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward" – COM (2003) 284 final, 21 May 2003, 15‐16.

191 Arbeitsgruppe Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 24 ZIP 863, 869 (2003); Fleischer (note 174), 528; Jan von Hein, Vom Vorstandsvorsitzenden zum CEO?, 166 ZHR 464, 500‐501 (2002); Hopt (note 142), 815; Hopt (note 157), 1051; Hopt & Leyens (note 1), 163‐164; LIEDER (note 2), 643‐645; Walter Bayer, Empfehlen sich besondere Regelungen für börsennotierte und für geschlossene Gesellschaften?, in VERHANDLUNGEN DES 67. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES, Vol. 1, E112‐E113 (Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages ed., 2008); Theodor Baums, Zur monistischen Verfassung der deutschen Aktiengesellschaft, in GEDÄCHTNISSCHRIFT FÜR MICHAEL GRUSON, 1, 4‐7, 32‐33 (Stephan Hutter & Theodor Baums eds., 2009).

192 DAV (German Lawyers’ Association), Stellungnahme zum Aktionsplan der EU‐Kommission, 6 NZG 1008, 1011 (2003); Karel van Hulle & Silja Maul, Aktionsplan zur Modernisierung des Gesellschaftsrechts und Stärkung der Corporate Governance, 33 ZGR 484, 493‐494 (2004); Maximilian Schiessl, Leitungs‐ und Kontrollstrukturen im

internationalen Wettbewerb, 167 ZHR 235, 250 Mitbestimmungsvereinbarungen, 50 AG 413, 429 (2005).

(2003);

Christoph

H.

Seibt,

Privatautonome

193 Walter Bayer & Jessica Schmidt, “Going European“ continues, 53 AG R31, R32 (2008); Eidenmüller, Engert & Hornuf (note 165), 728.

194

Eidenmüller, Engert & Hornuf (note 165), 728.

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