tible because the Islamist groups who propagate these ideas seem to share their indignation, while promising to punish the guilty. And those who are resigned are grateful to anyone for whatever help and hope they can offer. In Nigeria as elsewhere, salafist groups have shown themselves adept at adapting their arguments and methods when courting different constituencies.
Conclusions and Recommendations.
The challenges the Izala, IMN, MIR, and Boko Haram present the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya have led them to add another dimension to the various community out- reach programs they each run. There is little doubt that these programs are central to the Brotherhoods’ efforts to attract new followers and to improve the lives of existing members and the wider community. Yet unavoidably (although not unintentionally) they have assumed another purpose; to stop individuals from joining or supporting one of the radical Islamic groups. This suggests that the rivalry between the Qa- diriyya and Tijaniyya and the Islamist groups is mostly zero-sum. A triumph for one represents a defeat for the other; the recruitment of an individual means there is one less person who can support their adversary. On no account can there be mutually assisted growth.
That it is this way is mainly the result of the an- tagonistic positions they have each adopted in relation to the other. Indeed, part of the Izala’s raison d’être is to confront Sufism. Yet the collision this invites is made all the more certain by the fragility of what can be termed the middle ground. To claim that there is no third way would be untrue. In fact, there are various alternatives to siding with either the Brotherhoods or Islamist groups. These include supporting the Sultan,