Finally we feel that giving banks a stronger incentive to lend by cutting the interest rate on government borrowing will also help. The evidence reported above is only suggestive but it does suggest that where lending is difficult, making lending to the government less lucrative can have a strong effect on the willingness of bankers to make loans to the private sector. Thus it is the less obviously creditworthy firms that suffer most from the high rates of government borrowing.
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