organs, a secretary to handle party correspondence and documentation, and a party accountant.
Despite the passing of resolutions for cooperation with the GMD, the policy was not smoothly implemented immediately afterwards, indeed it was hardly implemented at all. The Central Bureau of the party decided to move back to Shanghai as it felt that not much could be achieved with Sun Yat-sen. In addition, it wanted to create new organizations in the north either to bring about a radical change in the dominant opinions within the GMD, or to create a new nationalist party. This was quite contrary to Maring's intentions although even he was moved to muse about a GMD without Sun at its head.
The disillusionment with Sun stemmed from his obsession with a military solution to China's problems and his resistance to the reorganization of the GMD. This was fueled by what the communists saw as his inactivity concerning the situation in Beijing. In June 1923, through the intrigues of Cao Kun, Li Yuanhong was dismissed as President of the Republic. The CCP saw the resultant power vacuum as providing Sun with the perfect chance to place himself at the head of the national movement by going to Shanghai and convening there a National Assembly. However, Sun rejected these overtures, claiming that the Assembly was an impossibility and that when the merchants understood this they would rally to him.
Mistrust persisted in the relationship with the GMD with Gunagdong being the main exception. Borodin's arrival in Canton had put life back into the process of expanding cooperation between the CCP and the GMD. This was helped by promises of even greater Soviet financial support and the reorganization of the GMD that finally took place in January 1924. Borodin worked within the general framework sketched out in the Comintern’s decisions on the China question of January and May 1923. According to the Comintern, the main targets of the revolution were imperialism and its Chinese supporters. While fighting these enemies, the CCP was to strengthen its position within the GMD and more broadly within the nationalist movement through CCP control of the peasant and labor movements. To use Stalin’s metaphor, the GMD-right would be squeezed like a lemon and flung aside. All acknowledged that a time would come when the interests of the bourgeoisie at the head of the nationalist movement would clash with those of the proletariat. At this point, the representatives of the proletariat were to cease the temporary cooperation and take over leadership. Deciding when this time had come proved difficult and it was Chiang Kai-shek who acted first putting down the CCP-led workers’ movement in Shanghai in April 1927.
Initially, the united front had proved very successful for the small group of communists. Between January 1924 and May 1926, communist influence in the GMD grew steadily and CCP membership grew from just under 1,000 in January 1925 to almost 58,000 by April 1927. Communist influence in the urban areas received a boost from the nationalist demonstrations of the May 30th Movement (1925). The protection of the nationalist armies in the south helped the CCP to develop its influence among the peasantry. Of special importance in this latter respect was the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet set up by Peng Pai.