need to place the rural revolution at the center of the stage but only within the context of the continued alliance with GMD.
The high-point in CCP compromise came with the adoption by an enlarged CC meeting on 30 June of an 11-point resolution on relations between the two parties. The resolution acknowledged that the GMD was the leader of the national revolution. Communists in government functions were to work only as GMD members. To minimize conflicts, communists holding government positions would give up their posts. Further, mass organizations were instructed to submit to the leadership and control of the GMD authorities. At a late stage, the party was stumbling towards the formation of a "bloc without" rather than a "bloc within," something that had been suggested by Chen Duxiu on a number of occasions.
Submissive gestures did not resolve the conflicts with the GMD-left in Wuhan. Wang Jingwei’s suspicions of the communists had been aroused further in early-June when the Comintern delegate, M. N. Roy, had shown him the contents of a telegram from Stalin. It called for the communists to reorganize the left and expel "reactionary leaders" and to prepare concrete steps for a revolutionary army, albeit still under nationalist leadership.
An uneasy truce prevailed until mid-July and then events moved rapidly. Under pressure from the Comintern, Chen Duxiu resigned his position as General Secretary. On 12 July, a new five-person temporary standing committee of the Politburo was chosen and the following day it issued an open statement critical of the Wuhan government. On 15 July, the Wuhan GMD Political Affairs Committee announced the end of cooperation; on 1 August, the CCP’s Nanchang Uprising was launched; and on 5 August, Wang Jingwei began a large-scale purge of communist activists. Cooperation was ending in tragedy and it was clear that a new strategy had to be found by the CCP.
During the early part of the twenties, CCP capacity to develop the labor movement and move out of isolation was hampered by a lack of finances and personnel. Work in Shanghai was made even more difficult by the foreign presence. In addition, CCP organizers had to compete with other organizations that had already established a presence among the working class in Shanghai. Communist access was frequently blocked by the Green and Red gangs and even by the YMCA, while in Guangzhou the GMD and the anarchists enjoyed greater popularity and influence. In May 1924, the Shanghai party committee summed up results to date in labor organization as "nil."
The May 30th Movement and the launch of the Northern Expedition had provided the CCP the chance to break out of this isolation. However, problems persisted. The party remained short of skilled personnel to organize on the ground and to develop extensive grass-roots support. Many of the recruits, because of relaxed membership requirements, did not understand CCP principles. As a result of its lack of labor power at the grass roots, the party attempted to gain control of the movement generated by nationalist sentiment from the top down. Thus, the CCP set up the Shanghai General Labor Union at the start of the May 30th Movement but this had to be closed down in mid-September 1925 partly because of lack of revolutionary momentum and partly because of attacks on