X hits on this document

PDF document

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY DURING THE ERA OF THE - page 24 / 48

144 views

0 shares

1 downloads

0 comments

24 / 48

only from Stalin’s need to show infallibility in his political struggles with Trotsky but also from the situation within China. Significant members of the GMD still supported the CCP and it was hoped that they could be rallied to the communist cause. In the GMD central leadership there was Song Qingling (Sun Yat-sen’s widow) and Deng Yanda, in the military He Long and Ye Ting. A number of grassroots GMD branches and troops also favoured the communists. The Comintern’s need to place the blame on the CCP leadership is apparent in Lominadze’s speech to Conference. According to Lominadze, far from having given had advice, the fault lay in the failure of the CCP to carry out Comintern instructions among the masses.

In terms of organization, the party prepared itself for a life underground and instructed members to "forge strong, secret" organizations. Priority was still given to the conservation of party cells within labor unions. A new nine-person temporary Politburo was elected pending the convocation of a Congress and it in turn elected a three-person Standing Committee of Qu Qiubai, Li Weihan, and Su Zhaozheng.

The new Conference strategy of rebellions, inciting army mutinies and initiating peasant uprisings was not successful leading to a further depletion of the communist forces. However, failure did not dampen the CCP’s enthusiasm (particularly that of Qu Qiubai). In November 1927 policy for the rural and urban areas was radicalized. Landlords, big and small, were to be shown no leniency and workers were to take power in the factories into their own hands. This decision led to the disaster of the Guangzhou Commune uprising in December 1927.

The defeat of the Guangzhou Commune coming so swiftly after the defeats of the communists in the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings, made it clear that a shift in tactics was necessary. It was impossible for the Party Center under Qu Qiubai to continue with its "putschism." The party had lost contact with the working-class in major centers such as Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou. The insurrectionary policy even where the peasantry had been mobilized had been intended to restore the initiative to the proletariat under the CCP’s leadership by seizing major urban centers. The failure of this approach signalled the effective end of the proletariat as the main force of the revolution. Over time this would also lead to a drastic reduction in Comintern influence over real policy implementation in the CCP.

A National Congress was needed to reassess the past and sanction a shift in policy direction. Thus, preparations began for the Sixth Congress and for reasons of security it was held in Moscow (18 June to 11 July 1928). The Congress had two points of departure. First, that while the policy of military confrontation with the GMD was now inevitable, second, the reckless "putchism" pursued under Qu Qiubai’s leadership had not shown any tangible success. Not surprisingly, Comintern influence was dominant. The "Political Decision" described the revolution as being in a trough between two waves. The first revolutionary wave had receded because of "repeated failures" and the new wave had not yet arrived. This notion allowed the "putchism" of Qu Qiubai to be attacked while supporting future insurrections. Judging the waves was a difficult business and it is

Document info
Document views144
Page views144
Page last viewedThu Dec 08 00:40:28 UTC 2016
Pages48
Paragraphs248
Words25259

Comments