as Liu Renjing, spent most of the subsequent period in GMD jails followed by re-arrest after the CCP came to power in 1949.
Unfortunately the revolutionary tide that the Comintern thought it spotted did not exist, at least in the urban areas. The Comintern’s insistence on political strikes and preparation for armed insurrection served to alienate the proletariat rather than to rally it to the communist cause. The CCP leadership decided to use the rising soviet movement in the countryside as means of recapturing its influence in the cities. This policy reached its fruition under Li Lisan’s direction and was spelled out in the Politburo decision of 11 June 1930. The current stage was seen as one of revolutionary upsurge and it proposed that Wuhan be seized as a part of the take over of one or more provinces. The resolution sought to implement the Comintern’s wishes in China but the failure of the strategy caused it to become the focus of critical attention in the Soviet Union some months later.
The resolution was sent to the Comintern for approval but the Comintern delayed making a formal reply, possibly because of the link made by Li Lisan between the Chinese and world revolutions. Later the Comintern was to criticize the efforts made in the resolution to show the interdependence of the Chinese Revolution and the world revolution. The 11 June resolution claimed that because China was the weakest link in the ruling chain of world imperialism, the Chinese revolution could occur first setting off the world revolution and the final class war. While such an analysis could be justified in terms of the Comintern’s view that the stability of world capitalism would soon erode, though at an uneven pace depending on place, the Comintern may not have been happy to have Li Lisan lecturing them on the world revolution. The resolution also hinted at the need for Soviet aid, something that Li Lisan would soon openly ask for. This was ignored by the Comintern. It was not in a position to call on the Soviet Union to support the Chinese Revolution. This appeal was later denounced as an error of "semi-Trotskyism." The prediction that a successful bourgeois-democratic revolution would soon be transformed into a socialist one was also cited later as proof of Li’s Trotskyite tendencies. However, this too had been a prediction in line with Comintern analysis at the time.
On 16 July, the Party Center sent another letter to the Presidium of the ECCI calling for approval of the strategy outlined in the resolution of 11 June. Two days later, the National Conference of CCP Organizations opened in Shanghai. The Conference announced that the general task of the party was to organize armed uprisings to seize political power and that the party was one preparing to take power. Further it called for action committees to be established at the central and local levels. In the "red areas," workers’ and peasants’ revolutionary committees were to be established. These would be the sole leading organs.
Eventually the Comintern replied in a letter dated 23 July 1930 to the CCP CC. The letter has produced different interpretations. The letter contained no substantial disagreement with Li Lisan either in the general policy or even with respect to practical strategy. What was indicated between the lines, however, was worry over Li Lisan’s operations and shirking of responsibility, which fully accorded with the position of the Comintern leaders in the early thirties. The Comintern leaders were not so foolhardy as Li to claim