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harshly criticized Wang Ming’s slogan of "everything through the united front." Mao went on to criticize Wang Ming’s idea of using legal channels to develop the communist movement and Wang’s strategy of moving from the cities to the countryside, a mistake, Mao clearly implied, that derived from the influence of the Soviet revolution on Wang Ming. Mao made it clear that China’s revolution would move from the countryside to the cities.

The political resolution did not include harsh condemnations of Wang Ming’s approach. It was not yet necessary to risk upsetting the situation by informing the rank and file. It was enough that Mao had told the party’s inner-circle. Having dealt Wang a serious blow at the Plenum, immediately afterwards, the party’s regional bureau system was reorganized resulting in an undermining of Wang Ming’s organizational position. On 9 November, Wang’s Yangtze Bureau was abolished and its former area of jurisdiction was placed under two new bureaux, the Southern Bureau headed by Zhou Enlai and the Central Plain’s Bureau headed by Liu Shaoqi. Both were loyal to Mao.

With the Party Center reunited in Yan’an, it was decided to bring order to the ad hoc decision-making that had taken place during the years of dislocation. In addition, it was important to outline rules for how the party organizations should function in the different environments they inhabited. As a result, three resolutions were adopted on concrete organizational questions. The united front meant that the CCP could come out of its secret existence and engage in a wide range of activities. Such activities were to be used to expand party influence, independence was to be retained and "capitulationism" resisted. A resolution on work rules and discipline sought to regularize the channels through which decisions were made and information was circulated. Thus, individuals were forbidden from speaking on behalf of the party or distributing documents in its name unless entrusted to do so by the CC or other leading organs.

The Resolution reconfirmed that the CC was the highest organ of the party when the National Congress was not in session but then went on to outline where real power lay. When the CC was not in session, the Politburo elected by it would guide work. The Politburo was to meet at least once every three months. The section on the Secretariat indicates the growing power of this organization in party affairs. The Secretariat was to convene Politburo meetings and prepare the issues to be discussed. It was to meet at least once a week. This placed it in an extremely powerful position by allowing it to control the flow of information and effectively control the agenda. Most importantly, between Politburo meetings, if a new emergency arose and the Politburo could not be convened immediately, the Secretariat could make new decisions and issue them in the name of the CC. Only afterwards would the Secretariat have to seek the approval of the Politburo. The Plenum placed Mao Zedong in control of the daily work of the Secretariat.

The renewed cooperation between the CCP and the GMD also allowed work in the urban areas of China to pick up once again. As shown above, despite a devastated organization, the few remaining communists in Shanghai had kept alive some activities through a number of front organizations and through the infiltration of other groups engaged in patriotic resistance to Japanese aggression. Liu Shaoqi, who had been placed in charge of

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