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Bolshevik form of organization in the party press. Secondly, there was the influence of the Comintern emissaries such as Voitinsky and Maring who already had experience of such party organization and devoted considerable time to propagating their views. Indeed Maring was appalled by the lack of discipline that he witnessed in the early CCP. Maring provided information on the idea and importance of party organization and of propaganda as a political weapon. Further, he stressed that the CCP’s struggle was linked to and formed an integral part of the much wider worldwide struggle against imperialism. Within this context, according to Maring and subsequent Comintern agents, the interests and policies of the national party were subordinate to the Comintern.

Third, in the twenties there was the gradual return of influential individuals such as Cai Hesen who had studied in Europe and had become acquainted with both communist ideology and organization as well as the modern labor movement. As the twenties progressed, the idea of a Bolshevik party was strengthened through the visits or training of key CCP figures in Soviet Russia. The first group of Chinese students went to Soviet Russia for study as early as spring 1921 and some 1,000 were trained in the twenties and thirties at the Communist University of the Working People of China. While the students who returned from Soviet Russia were a very varied group they had all received a thorough training in concepts of party organization and discipline. Of particular importance for the subsequent development of the CCP were Wang Ming, Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang and Chen Yun.

The Comintern was also influential in shaping the discourse of the CCP and the form of its inner-party struggle. The existing influence of the Comintern and the use of ideology as a weapon in inner-party struggle was increased by the removal of Chen Duxiu as party leader at the 7 August Emergency Conference of 1927. Chen’s removal was a potentially traumatic event in CCP history. For many, Chen had been a symbol of progress not just from the May Fourth Movement (1915-19), but from his earlier struggles against the Imperial system. A number of the early leaders had been drawn into the party because of personal connections and loyalty to Chen. In terms of the Chinese tradition, to turn on a respected senior and elder was an event of major significance.

Chen’s removal was legitimized not merely through criticism of his "mistakes" but also through the invocation of ideological symbols to justify the attack. Adherence to the correct ideological line came to legitimize policy, and understanding of the "line" was a necessary condition for leadership. This had the effect of strengthening Comintern control over party leadership as the Comintern was thought to possess a "higher wisdom" and vision of the revolutionary process than a mere national party. Concurrently, debate in the party became governed by the manipulation of ideological symbols with the result that genuine debate about policy disputes became even less feasible than had previously been the case. As the resolution of the Second Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee (CC) of the CCP pointed out (June 1929), there was no such thing as peace in the party. Erroneous tendencies always had to be fought against. All too often policy dispute was raised to the level of line struggle. Thus, the 7 August Emergency Conference (1927) ushered in ideological correctness as a key element in control, leadership and cohesion within the CCP. With this many of the debates within the Soviet Communist Party and

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