articulated a coherent policy for impounding the vehicle, basing the impoundment on the arrestee’s
status as a driver, owner, or passenger is “irrational and inconsistent with ‘caretaking’ functions”
(Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353).
Surmising that the purported policyrequired towing “any time the arrestee is carted off to jail,
regardless of whether another person could have removed the car and readily eliminated any traffic
congestion, parking violation, or road hazard,” the Seventh Circuit determined that the impoundment
was unreasonable because Duguay’s girlfriend had been driving the car, possessed the keys, and was
prepared to remove the car from the street and also because Duguay’s brother was present and also
might have been able to move the car. Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353. The Seventh Circuit added that
“[t]he policy of impounding the car without regard to whether the defendant can provide for its
removalis patently unreasonable if the ostensible purpose for impoundment is for the ‘caretaking’ of
the streets.” Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353.
First, we note that the Seventh Circuit’s commentary on the caretaking function of the
impoundment policy in Duguay is dicta because the fourth amendment issue was decided based on
the State’s failure to articulate a standardized impoundment procedure. The fact-specific holding in
Duguay does not apply to this case.
Second, the purported impoundment policy in Duguay is distinguishable from the
impoundment mandate of section 6—303(e) of the Vehicle Code. The police procedure in Duguay
was deemed to be unreasonable because it did not consider the possibility that the vehicle could be
removedlegallywithout impoundment. In contrast, here, section 6—303(e) mandated impoundment
because the vehicle could not be removed legally. Neither the teenage passenger nor anyone coming
to defendant’s aid could operate the vehicle without liability insurance (see 625 ILCS 5/7—601(a),