3—707(a) (West 2008)), and the absence of insurance was established at the scene by defendant’s
failure to show an insurance card (see 625 ILCS 5/3—707(b) (West 2008)).
The Duguay court explained, “we do not see what purpose denying possession of the car to
a passenger, a girlfriend, or a family member could possibly serve.” Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353. In
contrast, Hucker did not deny possession of the vehicle to the teenage passenger or anyone else
because no one at the scene asked for it. Moreover, the purpose of impounding the car in this case
was clear: preventing an uninsured vehicle from being operated in violation of the Vehicle Code.
Defendant next argues that this case is similar to Harrington v. Heavey, No. 04—C—5991,
2006 WL 3359388 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2006) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d). Harrington filed a civil
rights action against various police of icers, alleging that the impoundment of her car violated her
fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. Based on a minor traf ic violation, Officer Heaveystopped
a vehicle driven by Harrington’s son, who was driving with an expired license. Harrington, 2006 WL
3359388, at *1. The officer issued citations for speeding and driving without a valid license. The
of icer seized the car pursuant to a city ordinance that mandated the seizure of vehicles driven by
persons not possessing valid licenses. A ter being stopped, the driver called Harrington, who arrived
at the scene. Harrington showed the officer her valid license and proof of liability insurance, and she
asked for the car. The of icer refused and impounded the vehicle. Later that evening, Harrington
regained custody of the car after paying the city’s $500 administrative seizure fee and towing charges.
Harrington, 2006 WL 3359388, at *1. Seeking damages, Harrington’s complaint alleged that the
impoundment was unreasonable under the fourth amendment and that the seizure ordinance’s lack