of pretowing and adequate posttowing hearing procedures violated the fourteenth amendment.
Harrington, 2006 WL 3359388, at *1.
In determining whether the impoundment was reasonable under the fourth amendment, the
district court stated, “the decision to impound pursuant to the seizure ordinance does not, in and of
itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure. Instead, reliance on and reference to the seizure
ordinance merely raises the relevant legal question of whether the City’s mandatory impoundment
policy serves the police’s community caretaking function such that impoundments under that policy
are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Harrington, 2006 WL 3359388, at *5. Relying on
Duguay, the district court foundthe seizure ordinance unconstitutional because it “deprives the City’s
officers from considering alternatives to impoundment and thus, from determining whether
community caretaking interests justifyimpoundment ina particular instance.” Harrington, 2006 WL
3359388, at *5.
The Harrington court commented that, even if the impoundment policy were discretionary,
the seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances where Harrington provided at the scene proof
that she was the owner, she had a valid license and proof of insurance, she was prepared to remove
the vehicle herself, and there was no indication that she was impaired or otherwise incapable of
lawfully operating the vehicle. Harrington, 2006 WL 3359388, at *5.
Like Duguay, Harrington isdistinguishable fromthis casebecausetheimpoundment mandate
of section 6—303(e) is based in part on the absence of liability insurance (as established by lack of
proof of insurance), which would prevent a car from being removed from the scene legally.
Harrington stands for the proposition that adherence to an impoundment policy does not necessarily