render an impoundment reasonable under the fourth amendment, but defendant does not allege that
section 6—303(e) is unconstitutional.
The parties stipulated at the hearing that the vehicle was, in fact, insured; but Hucker did not
know that at the time of the impoundment. Moreover, Hucker had little reason to believe defendant
when she told himthat the car was insured. Besides insisting that the car was insured, defendant also
had said that her driver’s license was at home, which gave the false impression that her driving
privileges were not suspended. Regardless of defendant’s credibility, the absence of proof of
insurance at the scene meant that defendant was deemed to be operating an uninsured motor vehicle.
See 625 ILCS 5/3—707(b) (West 2008). If the teenage passenger had shown a valid license,
volunteered to promptly retrieve proof of insurance from defendant’s home, agreed to remove the
vehicle, and been not otherwise impaired from lawfully operating the vehicle, one could argue that
impoundment would have been unreasonable under the fourth amendment. However, no such offer
was made and defendant’s assertion that the teenage passenger could have removed the vehicle
lawfully is speculative at best. Regardless, it would be unreasonable and unduly burdensome to
require the officer to remain at the scene and wait an indeterminate period for someone to possibly
return and cure the conditions that mandated the impoundment.
Despite the unambiguous impoundment mandate of section 6—303(e) of the Vehicle Code,
the trial court concluded that there were alternative means that a reasonable police officer would have
taken that would not have violated defendant’s fourth amendment rights, such as locking the car and
seizing the keys until proof of insurance was produced. Defendant echoes the trial court’s position,