mandated the original impoundment of the vehicle. Second, the trialcourt heard unrebutted evidence
that the purpose of the inventory search was to protect the owner’s property and to protect the police
from claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property. Third, the trial court found that Hucker
conducted the inventory search in good faith. The inventory search was pursuant to reasonable
standardized police procedures and was not a pretext for an investigatory search. See Hundley, 156
Ill. 2d at 138. Thus, the trial court erred in entering the suppression order.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court erroneously suppressed the evidence. Section
6—303(e) of the Vehicle Code required the officer to impound the vehicle because (1) defendant was
driving with a suspended license (see 625 ILCS 5/6—303(a) (West 2008)) and (2) defendant was
deemed to be operating an uninsured vehicle, because she failed to show proof of liability insurance
(see 625 ILCS 5/3—707(b) (West 2008)). See 625 ILCS 5/6—303(e) (West 2008). Because the
impoundment was mandated by the Vehicle Code and the officer testified in detail regarding his
adherence to the procedures for impounding and inventorying the vehicle, we conclude that the
search was reasonable. Under these circumstances, where the teenage passenger of undetermined
age did not attempt to establish at the scene that the vehicle could be removed legally, the fourth
amendment did not require the officer to investigate methods to facilitate the removal of the vehicle
to avoid the impoundment.
For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: