produce a valid driver’s license and “readily obtainable proof of insurance.” The court noted that
Hucker could have seized the car keys and locked the doors while the teenage passenger walked four
blocks to defendant’s home and retrieved the insurance card. Despite finding that Hucker acted in
good faith and that defendant did not show proof of insurance at the scene, the court determined that
the police should not have impounded and searched the car, because it was, in fact, insured.
The State moved for reconsideration of the suppression, and the trial court denied the motion
on August 10, 2009. On the same date, the State timely filed a notice of appeal and a certificate of
The burden of proof is on the defendant at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. 725
ILCS 5/114—12(b) (West 2008); People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (2003). If the defendant
makes a prima facie case that the evidence was obtained through an illegal search, the State can
counter with its own evidence. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 239.
When reviewing a trial court’s suppression ruling, this court applies a two-part standard of
review. People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 271 (2008); People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542
(2006) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). The trial court’s factual indings
are entitled to great deference, and we will reverse them only if they are against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271. However, a reviewing court “ ‘remains free to undertake
its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues,’ ” and we review de novo the trial court’s
ultimate legal ruling as to whether suppression is warranted. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271 (quoting
Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542-43).