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No. 2—09—0833

produce a valid driver’s license and “readily obtainable proof of insurance.” The court noted that

Hucker could have seized the car keys and locked the doors while the teenage passenger walked four

blocks to defendant’s home and retrieved the insurance card. Despite finding that Hucker acted in

good faith and that defendant did not show proof of insurance at the scene, the court determined that

the police should not have impounded and searched the car, because it was, in fact, insured.

The State moved for reconsideration of the suppression, and the trial court denied the motion

on August 10, 2009. On the same date, the State timely filed a notice of appeal and a certificate of



The burden of proof is on the defendant at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. 725

ILCS 5/114—12(b) (West 2008); People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (2003). If the defendant

makes a prima facie case that the evidence was obtained through an illegal search, the State can

counter with its own evidence. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 239.

When reviewing a trial court’s suppression ruling, this court applies a two-part standard of

review. People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 271 (2008); People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542

(2006) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). The trial court’s factual indings

are entitled to great deference, and we will reverse them only if they are against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271. However, a reviewing court “ ‘remains free to undertake

its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues,’ ” and we review de novo the trial court’s

ultimate legal ruling as to whether suppression is warranted. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 271 (quoting

Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542-43).

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