X hits on this document





15 / 28

means both to understand these conflicts more precisely, and to provide indications regarding

necessary training or real-time displays feedback which could mitigate conflicts. A candidate model for describing



comparing differences between pilot and controller differences is the Lens Model (Brunswik, 1955; Cooksey, 1996). The Lens Model, as typically instantiated, provides dual, symmetric models of both the human judge and the environment and can be used for capturing and comparing decision policies among different players in the free flight environment. The Lens Model has been successfully applied in numerous contexts (see Cooksey, 1996) such as medical decision-making and social policy judgments, to describe aspects of judgment performance. It has also been used in the past for analyzing judgment which are related to situations of interpersonal conflict (Brehmer, 1976). Recently efforts have been made to apply it into more dynamic environments like command and control (Bisantz et al., 2000), fault categorization and diagnosis in process control (Jha, 2001) and aircraft collision avoidance (Pritchett and Bisantz, 2002). In particular, in the latter study, the Lens Model was used to compare judgments made by different automated and human agents, using parameters from the Lens model to characterize differences among the judgment policies.

We are beginning a new research effort to examine the appropriateness of Lens Models of judgment for describing and supporting the resolution of judgment conflicts in the proposed new air traffic management concept called free flight.

Exemplar matching and cue criterion relations

Peter Juslin Umeå University E-mail: peter.juslin@psy.umu.se

We are pursuing our research that attempts to relate traditional multiple cue probability learning to basic research on cognitive processes and representations in cognitive science. A first study suggested that people do integrate multiple cues in m u l t i p l e c u e j u d g m e n t t a s k s , e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y b y exemplars, retrieving similar explicitly by or

abstracting cue-criterion relations during training that are later integrated into a judgment. In one series of experiments we have demonstrated that when the criterion of judgment is changed from a binary to a continuous variable (e.g., from a binary categorization task to a standard multiple cue judgment task) the processes shift from primarily exemplar-based processes to processes that involve abstraction of explicit cue-criterion relations. A couple of experiments, which we are just in the process of writing up, show that when the cue

combination rule is additive people are prone to rely on explicit cue abstraction, but when the combination rule is multiplicative, they turn to exemplar memory. These studies are in various stages of preparation or revision and should hopefully appear in print in the not so distant future. An underlying ambition with this line of research is to attain a more detailed cognitive understanding of the notions of "intuition" and "analysis", as well as to relate and interpret the lens model components in terms of cognitive processes.

Another project aims to understand what sort of knowledge people use to make probability judgments -- for example, exemplar knowledge, prototype similarity (representativeness), relative frequency, or frequency – by modeling participants’ probability judgments in controlled laboratory learning experiments. The background is that these theories are routinely invoked in various contexts and used to interpret findings post hoc, or for motivating general predictions about presence or absence of bias (e.g., overconfidence), but they are rarely tested (or even specified) in a more rigorous way. (And this goes for my own research too.) The purpose is to understand if and when people use these sorts of knowledge to make probability judgments as a function of the judge, the specific task, and the ecology.

Tracing shoe tracks José Kerstholt TNO Human Factors Email: kerstholt@tm.tno.nl

Pieter Koele Universiteit van Amsterdam Email: ml koele@macmail.psy.uva.nl

This month, Roos Paashuis started her research on how forensic researchers make their judgements. Verifiability is of utmost importance in forensic research. However, much of this research has a non-routine character, raising the question as to what extent interpretations and judgements can be made transparent. Roos will initially focus on one particular type of forensic research, the comparison of shoe tracks found at a crime scene with a particular shoe. The major goal of the PhD project is to characterise the process underlying these comparative judgements for both experts and novices, using Policy Capturing techniques. There seem to be two separate phases in this process: one in which the researcher identifies which cues are worth considering and a second one in which track and shoe are compared on these cues. As forensic researchers are supposed to explain their judgements in court (mostly in writing), the relation between the actual process

Newsletter 2002 page 15 of 28

Document info
Document views44
Page views44
Page last viewedThu Oct 27 05:07:54 UTC 2016