an MCPL task, but only when improper linear models fail to yield (nearly) correct predictions. And this in spite of the sub optimality of Outcome Feedback.
Following the learning task we gave the subjects in both conditions another block of 30 trials, now without OF, but after providing them with precise information about the task structure. In condition I subjects did slightly better than in block 3 of the learning phase (mean achievement = 0.82) and this was mainly the result of an increase in configural cue use: mean C = 0.36. In condition II mean achievement increased to 0.53, but this was mainly the result of an increase in linear task knowledge: mean G = 0.67, whereas mean C = 0.57.
As I am writing this abstract we are still a bit puzzled about these last results. It might be conceivable that a certain amount of cognitive laziness restrained the subjects in condition I from switching from a rather successful improper strategy to a configural strategy, but we expected the subjects in condition II to do much better. Or does this demonstrate once again that people find it very
difficult to work with start working on a experiment shortly.
negative linear relations? serious manuscript about
Different kinds of confidence
Josh Klayman University of Chicago E-mail: email@example.com
I'm continuing my interest in subjective confidence, looking at different kinds thereof. Jack Soll (INSEAD) and I are studying confidence expressed in terms of subjective intervals ("I'm 80% sure that the planet Neptune was discovered
between 1760 and 1940"...). findings of interest.
We have two main
Even using random sampling from whole
domains (to approximate representative sampling), subjective intervals show substantial overconfidence. That is, one's 80% intervals contain much less than 80% of the correct answers. Some of this is due to biasing effects of unbiased error in setting the endpoints of the interval. However, we demonstrate that subjective intervals are also
systematically too narrow.
2. How much too narrow they are depends on exactly how you ask for them. If, as above, you ask for a single interval, the intervals are barely half the size that a well-calibrated person would need. If you ask instead for two judgments--"I'm 90% sure it's greater than ... and I'm 90% sure it's less than ...", the implied 80% interval is larger--about 2/3 of the well-calibrated size. If you also ask for a median
estimate along with the two ends ("It's about equally likely to be more or less than ..."), then the interval is yet larger, almost the well-calibrated
Why? Well... we're working on that.
We'd be very interested to hear the hypotheses of our fellow Brunswikians!
The second kind of confidence I'm working on has to do with judgments about where one's
performance stands relative to others'. with Katherine Burson (here at Chicago)
In work and Rick
(Duke U.), we first weigh It seems that the poorest
in on a recent performers on a
task are standing cognitive cognitive
also those who most overestimate their relative to others. Is this an interesting phenomenon (a correlation between ability and the metacognitive ability to
you are) or the result of noisy to regression toward the mean,
are positively stand relative
biased in to others
judgments of where they only when they find the
task to be easy. When the actually negatively biased.
is difficult, they are now, we're looking
to create a egocentric
new debate: Does this represent anchoring on one's own ease
is it really a manifestation probabilistic cues to their impression of how hard it
of people's use of two standing, namely their was for them and their
impression of how people? We're still
hard it working
would be for other on that, but you can
probably guess that would tend toward the
a member of this latter explanation...
society Not that
we would let prior beliefs color our the data (not more than would appropriate, anyway!)
interpretation of be normatively
More on how he developed his ideas
Elke Kurz-Milcke, College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
Volume 5 of a series titled Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology edited by G. A. Kimble and M. Wertheimer (published by Erlbaum) is soon to appear and will contain a chapter on Brunswik. The chapter is titled Egon Brunswik: Student of achievement and was written in a transatlantic collaboration between Nancy Innis from the University of Western Ontario and myself, then working at the University of Tübingen in Germany. The chapter gives an overview to Brunswik’s life and work, emphasizing the period of time just after he arrived in the United States, a period of
Newsletter 2002 page 17 of 28