Study design, diagnosis and probability judgments and Brunswik’s contribution to the history of research on thinking
Mike Doherty, Bowling Green University, USA E-mail: email@example.com
Ryan Tweney and I have a Brunswik chapter in press for a book edited by Ken Manktelow. It is on Brunswik's contribution to the history and theory of research on thinking. I do not know what the expected publication date is; we have not seen page proofs yet.
I have a chapter in the edited by Sandy Schneider and Cambridge University Press.
forthcoming book Jim Shanteau for The book has
chapters roaming all over JDM, and my chapter was a commentary on the other contributions. There was no representation of SJT in the book, so I did include
a discussion attention to functioning.
in my chapter. I also called situation sampling and to
for more vicarious
The two presentations at the Brunswik Society will be as follows: 1. The paper by myself, Ryan Tweney & Yanlong Sun will be about the "rule of one variable." It will not be so much a Brunswikian paper as an argument from another perspective that is consistent
about a formal
that alternative hypotheses are crucial h y p o t h e s i s t e s t i n g , a n d a s e c o n d a r g u m e n in null showing t that alternative hypotheses are abundant than generally assumed. much more
2. The paper by John Leach and myself
is a report present it.
Otherwise I will. Here's the abstract.
Diagnoses and judgments of probability were analyzed in relation to external representation and style of sampling (i.e., completely natural, summarized frequency, and summarized frequency of yoked data). External representation did not produce a reliable effect. All conditions produced a high number of accurate diagnoses. Subjects exposed to completely natural sampling were 100% accurate in diagnosing the disease. However, fewer than 30% of all subjects reported the exact Bayesian probability. A pseudodiagnostic selection effect was obtained under the completely natural and summarized frequency sampling conditions. The disjunction between accuracy on diagnosis and accuracy on the more analytic aspects of this study
suggests that different cognitive
processes were at
work in findings
different parts of the
considerably lower performance on the probability estimate and pseudodiagnostic information selection were consistent with the proposition that the cognitive processes involved in global judgments and diagnoses differ from those involved in analytical reasoning.
Risk of suicide and Decisions to Observe Psychiatric In-Patients
Dawn Dowding, Brodie Paterson, Clare Cassells University of Stirling Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
We are currently engaged in a study that is examining how psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses in the UK make judgements about patients’ suicide risk in an acute in-patient setting, using social judgement approaches. We are particularly interested in exploring how judgements about suicide risk influence decisions about the level of ‘observation’ ordered in such settings. Case vignettes have been developed, using variables that have been identified from a literature review
and consultation with relevant experts. vignettes are undergoing checks for validity
The at the
clinicians from next 6 weeks.
acute psychiatric settings within the Suicide risk prediction is a complex
issue, and data how clinicians judgements.
should provide valuable insight into use information to inform their
The use of base rate information as a function of consistency and diagnosticity
Phil Dunwoody Crawfordville, GA E-mail: email@example.com
Myself, Adam Goodie, and Rob Mahan have recently finished a study examining how experience with base rates influences base rate usage. The ms is presently under review. I'm working as a land surveyor and putting my PhD to good use raising my 10 month old boy.
The use of base rate information has been widely studied in decision making with the conclusion that people underweight base rate information when compared to a normative standard. Three experiments demonstrate that base rate usage under direct experience is moderated by the consistency as well as the diagnosticity of base rate information. Experiment 1 shows that participants use base rate information more when it is consistent than when it is
inconsistent. In Experiment replicated, and transferred to in verbal questions posed
2, this effect was base rate sensitivity
Newsletter 2002 page 9 of 28