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however, 205th MI Brigade and 800th Military Police Brigade

leaders at Abu Ghraib failed to execute their assigned

responsibilities. The leaders from units located at Abu

Ghraib or with supervision over Soldiers and units at Abu

Ghraib, failed to supervise subordinates or provide direct

oversight of this important mission. These leaders failed

to properly discipline their Soldiers. These leaders failed

to learn from prior mistakes and failed to provide

continued mission-specific training. The 205th MI Brigade

commander did not assign a specific subordinate unit to be

responsible for interrogations at Abu Ghraib and did not

ensure that a Military Intelligence chain of command at Abu

Ghraib was established. The absence of effective leadership

was a factor in not sooner discovering and taking actions

to prevent both the violent/sexual abuse incidents and the

misinterpretation/confusion incidents.

Neither Department of Defense nor Army doctrine caused

any abuses. Abuses would not have occurred had doctrine

been followed and mission training conducted. Nonetheless,

certain facets of interrogation and detention operations

doctrine need to be updated, refined or expanded,

including, the concept, organization, and operations of a

Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC); guidance

for interrogation techniques at both tactical and strategic

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