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levels; the roles, responsibilities and relationships

between Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel

at detention facilities; and, the establishment and

organization of a Joint Task Force structure and, in

particular, its intelligence architecture.

Other Contributing Factors

Demands on the Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

capabilities in a counterinsurgency and in the future joint

operational environment will continue to tax tactical and

strategic assets. The Army needs trained and experienced

tactical HUMINT personnel.

Working alongside non-DOD organizations/agencies in

detention facilities proved complex and demanding. The

perception that non-DOD agencies had different rules

regarding interrogation and detention operations was

evident. Interrogation and detention policies and limits of

authority should apply equally to all agencies in the Iraqi

Theater of Operations.

"Ghost Detainees"

My investigation resulted in specific findings

regarding the issue of "ghost detainees" within Abu Ghraib.

It is clear that the interrogation practices of other

government agencies led to a loss of accountability at Abu

Ghraib. DOD must document and enforce adherence by other

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