to issues affecting command and control, doctrine,
training, and the experience of the Soldiers we asked to
perform this vital mission.
The abuses at Abu Ghraib primarily fall into two
categories: a) intentionally violent or sexual abuse and,
b) abusive actions taken based on misinterpretations or
confusion regarding law or policy.
LTG Jones found that while senior level officers did
not commit the abuses at Abu Ghraib, they did bear
responsibility for lack of oversight of the facility,
failing to respond in a timely manner to the indications
and warnings provided by reports of incidents within the
command and as reported by agencies such as reports from
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and for
issuing policy memos that failed to provide clear,
consistent guidance for execution at the tactical level.
MG Fay found that from 25 July 2003 to 6 February
2004, twenty-seven 205th MI BDE Personnel allegedly
requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited Military
Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and/or
participated in detainee abuse and/or violated established
interrogation procedures and applicable laws and
regulations during interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib.